ON THE SELECTIVE HEDGING OF BANK ASSETS WITH TREASURY BILL FUTURES CONTRACTS Introduction
Recent economic conditions have stimulated a search for quick and i nexpensi ve methods to reduce the interest rate r; sk borne by banks and other financial intermediaries. Typically, banks borrow short-term and lend long-term funds. This balance sheet structure exposes the bank to the ri sk that interest rates will ri se unpredictably, narrow; og the spread between asset and liability interest rates. Increased interest rate volatility creates planning problems for bank management. These factors, along with a he; ghtened compet it i ve envi ronment ; n the bank; og ; ndus'tr-y , work to erode interest rate spreads and create a need for new ri sk management tools.
In response to these recent conditions, banks have sought a match of interest rate-sensi t i ve assets with ; nterest rate-sensi t t ve liabilities. One method of doing this is to substitute variable rate loans for those with fi xed rates. Another alternative is to restructure the balance sheet by either shortening the maturity of bank assets or 1engtheni ng the maturi ty of bank 1i abi 1it i es , Both al ternat i ves i nvol ve either waiting until bank portfolios turn over or selling long-term loans and investments to fund short-term loans and investments. Capital market imperfections usually prevent a quick sale of loans without risk of loss due to different market eval uations of loan assets. It is al so difficult to lengthen the term to maturity of bank liabilities without a significant increase in the cost of bank funds. All of these methods of responding to \ -2-current market conditions represent relatively long-term solutions to the problem.
This article focuses on a short-term solution to the problems of match; n9 ; nterest r-at.e-sens t t t vee assets and 1; abil iti es. Fi nanci al futures contracts can be used to hedge the gap between rate-insensitive assets and rate-sensitive liabilities, effectively protecting the value of assets. To hedge the r-t sk of an ; nc tease in; nterest rates. the bank sells a T-bi 11 futures contract! call ing for the future del t very of securities in an amount sufficient to lock in the value of bank assets relative to 1;abil Hies.
Use of financial futures marketsal'ow banks to respond qut ckl y to changes in the economic environment and to continue making long-term, fixed rate loans. However, there is evidence that the precentage of banks currently using financial futures is quite small. Unfortunately, the hedging strategy they employ is not based on a theory of bank behavior. One approach is to assume that total bank liabil ities are exogenous and the probl em for the banking fi rm centers on optimal asset choice, where asset returns are uncertain. Another approach is to focus on the liability side of the balance sheet, assuming the asset side is exogenously determined. In this situation, the banking firm can decide on either deposit quantities with interest rates given (perhaps by Regulation Q or market forces) or depos it rates with random depos it flows. Fi nelly, the most complete approach goes beyond the partial models of asset or liability choice to consider the interaction of asset and liability decisions.
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The approach used in this paper is a complete model of the banking firm, but with simplifications to facilitate a simulation of To initiate a futures trade, margin money must be deposited with a commodity broker. This margin is not applied against the value of the futures contract as in a stock purchase but is held by the brokerage house = the interest rate on T-bills with 90 days to maturity.
= the interest rate on T-bills with 180 days to maturity.
= the interest rate on a 13-week T-bill futures contract 90 days before maturity. RB = the rate of return on purchased or sold funds for 90 days, R O = the rate of return payable on demand and savings deposits,
f L(L) = the real resource costs of servicing loan accounts, f'>O.
f'L>0' and f (T) ::: the real resource costs of making T-bill investments. f')O,
Note in equation (2) that the return to loans, T-bill investments, and T-bill futures trading is the price change in these discount instruments over the planning period. 9 It is also assumed that the real resource cost of operating the bank can be measured on the uses of funds side of the balance sheet.
The objective of the banking firm is to choose the ex ante controls T and X and the ex post control B to maximize the expected utility of profit, denoted U(1l"). subject to the balance sheet constraint in equat t on (1) and the expectati ons about the futu re , Sf nee the balance sheet constraint can be solved for the ex post control B, in terms of the ex ante controls, T and X, the relevant maximization problem can be stated as:
where E = the expectations operator, and it is assumed the regulatory constraint a~X~-(L+T) appl tes .
Bank management is assumed to be risk averse so that U 1 (1t" » O and U"(1t")<O. Recall the random variables in this problem are RL' Rp and D. Bank management is assumed to possess a subjective, joint probability distribution on these random variables,
Furthermore it is assumed this joint distribution does not change over the planning horizon.
The first order optimality conditions for this problem are given
By subtracting condition (5) from condition (4), the optimal T-bill investment decision ;s the solution of:
Since no random elements appear in condition (6) In the fight hand side of equation (9). it seems plausible that:
(i) the covariance between the interest rates on loans and T-bills Less will be hedged in the futures market. since the bank expects it·s interest rate exposu re to be sma 11 e r. In fact, the bank mi ght even des ire to specu 1ate in interest rate futures (X* > 0), if interest rates are expected to fall sufficiently far, and regulators allowed such behavior. Conversely, the greater the expected T-b i 11 rate at the end of the period or the greater the expected decline in T-bill prices, the greater the futures market hedge.
Also note that the greater the sensitivity of deposit flows to T-bill rates, the greater the futures market hedge. The more sensitive deposit outflows are to higher T-bill interest rates, the greater the outflow of funds at T-bill rates rise. Relatively high cost funds must be purchased to balance the balance sheet. To protect against this squeez on profits, the bank is pushed toward a short liability rather than long asset futures position to lock in the known interest rate on assets. A short position is then used to protect against the higher cost of purchased funds when disintermediation is a problem.
The Hedging Simulation
To simulate the T-bill hedging strategy suggested by the model of the banking firm, observations for each of the elements on the right hand side of equation (9) must be collected. The purpose here is not to perform a complete simulation of all bank decisions in the model, but to calculate the optional futures position assuming the Tvbt l l investment decision is optimal.
In the last section, equation (6) The interest fate used to compute the variance of T-bill interest rates in the denominator of equation (9) ;s the monthly average of 13-week 'l-bt l l auction rates.
To capture the effects of changing interest fate volatility. the variance of cash 'l-b t l l fates was recalculated for each new hedging period. This procedure creates a time series measuring interest rate volatility over the simulation period.
The covariance between loan and T-bill ; nterest rates was computed and updated ; nasi mi 1ar manner using the monthly average prime fate for short-term business loans and the monthly average auction fate for 13-week T-bill s , The rate at which banks were assumed to sell or purchase funds was taken to be the monthly average The last variable to be specified is ERTt the three month forecast of the 13-week T-bill rate. Four alternative forecasts are studied.
Initially it was assumed that bank decision-makers make no interest rate forecast other than the interest rate expected by the T-bill From the pure expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates, the impl ied forward rate in the yield curve is an unbiased expectation of the actual future interest rate when markets are in equilibrium. Since the hedging simulation assumes the bank has a three-month planning horizon, a forecast of the three-month T-bill rate three months in the futures can be -16-found by squaring the current six-month T-bill rate and dividing by the current three-month T-bill rate. All variables are significant at the 1% level except the intercept term.
As expected, decreases in the three month moving average of the money supply and increases in real disposable income increase T-bill ret es , but only for the period prior to October 1979.
The fourth type of forecast used was the actual T-bi 11 interest rate existing at the end of the planning period. This forecast assumes that bank management can predict T-bill interest rates perfectly. The hedq l ng si mu 1at ion resu lts us; ng a perfect ; nterest rate forecast will serve as a performance standard for evaluating the other three alternative forecasts. Furthermore, usinq a perfect forecast in the simulation serves as a proxy for all other possible regression and time series models capable of predicting three-month T-bill interest rates.
Simulation Results Table 1 a Sample mean with sample standard deviation in parentheses.
* Significantly different than -1 at the 5% level.
**Significantly different than zero at the 5% level.
hedging results for banks less risk averse than in Table 1 . The risk aversion index, c, is here assumed to be lxlO-8•
In this situation. a 100% hedge of interest rate exposure is optimal for all sized banks when the T-bill forecast is taken from either the T-bill futures market or the regression model. Although these strategies do not generate significant profits. the reduction f n the variability of bank profits ts greater than any of the other strategies.
This conclusion about hedging effectiveness ts similar to the results in Table 1 , indicating its generality across different aversions to risk. It is also interesting that banks less averse to interest rate risk should optimally hedge more of their exposure rather than less. Yet this is the case for the two smallest size categories of banks, upon a comparison of Tables 1 and 2 , lines 2a and ae , The explanation for this lies in the regulatory constraint, O>X>-L-T. Banks desire to speculate on the short side of the market by selling Tc-b'i l l contracts with greater value than thei r interest rate exposure, but the regul atory constrai nt prohi bits them from doing so. Hence, a 100% hedge ;s the best that can be done.
As banks became less risk averse, one would expect that optimal hedging becomes more selective, except when using a T-bill futures market forecast as argued in the last paragraph. Therefore, the effectiveness of a hedging strategy at lower risk aversion levels should also be less.
I ndeed, these expectat ions are borne out, si nee the percent reduct i on in the variability of bank profits is smaller in Table 2 for all size categories and forecasts than in Table 1 . This is true even for hedging with either a T-bill futures market or the regression forecast, indicating that a 100% hedge of interest rate exposure does not necessarily lead to the greatest hedging effectiveness especially for banks in the two smallest size categories studied. The tendency for banks with assets between $. 5 and $1 billion to experience lower hedging effectiveness than either larger or smaller banks is preserved when banks are less risk averse. As for the significance of futures returns, significant positive returns are generated from the hedging simulation at low levels of risk aversion using either a T-bi 11 forecast from the forward market or a perfect forecast. Al so note that with either of these forecasts, the optimal hedging ratios are partial hedges.
To assess the impact of current regulations regarding futures trading by banks, the hedging simulation was al so conducted without constraining the T-bill futures position to be a bona fide hedge of interest rate exposure. That is, the optimal futures position was calculated with requring 02,.X>-L-T. The question is, what is the effect of regulating bank participation in interest rate futures markets and is this burden shared equally by all sized banks? Table 3 contains the simulation results when the T-bil1 futures position can assume any value on the real time and the risk aversion index is lxlO-6• Upon comparing Table 3 with Table 1 , note that in the absence of the regulatory constraint banks with assets of more than $1 billion and with assets between $100 and $500 mi 11 t on woul d opt i me11 y hedge more than 100% of their interest rate exposure. For the largest sized banks this involves average short speculation of 12% of their interest rate exposure, over the four alternative forecasts. For the smallest sized banks, short speculation averages 33% of their exposure over the four forecasts. The intermediate sized banks optimally hedge either less than, greater than, or Table 3 . In fact the mean differences between hedging effectiveness in Tables 1 and 2 Simulation results for banks with less than $100 million in deposits are available upon request to the author. 
Bank Asset Size in millions
More than lODO 500 -1000 100 -500 
